Blog 6 - Transboundary Management of Water resources - Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam

This blog shall explore the issues of Transboundary Waters and in particular the inherently political dynamic which entails said theme. In order to examine the political dynamics of Transboundary Waters, this blog shall use the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) as a case study to exemplify and illustrate the points of contestation and cooperation.

Figure 1 :https://www.water.ox.ac.uk/filling-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-seeking-middle-ground-on-the-nile/

UN Water states that Transboundary waters are the basins of rivers and lakes as well as aquifers that are shared between two or more countries. Transboundary Aquifers are particularly pertinent to Africa because as many as 60% of the African population lives within the confines of a transboundary aquifer. Around two-thirds of the world’s transboundary rivers do not have a framework for cooperative management (UN Water, 2018) hence explaining the the implied complexities in optimal management of said resources (Altchenko, 2013). Given the importance of water as a resource, its' management is imperative so as to avoid potential conflict between countries which fall under Transboundary Waters. Although only 28% of interactions over transboundary water resources have led to conflict since 1831 (Yoffe et.al, 2004), one feels that that number could very well increase given the predicted 145% rise of the African population by 2100 (Carter and Parker, 2009) as well as the threats posed by climate change. Thus, it is imperative that a new framework based on cooperation is sourced and put into practice in order to best manage transboundary water resources.

The example of the construction of the GERD illustrates both the issues of past interactions between various states and the potential hope for the future too. The GERD is situated in Ethiopia (as shown by Figure 1) in the upper course of the Nile. Salman (2013) states that the interests of Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt are the highest of the 11 countries which the Nile flows through. To that effect both Egypt and Sudan publicly denounced the construction of the dam with Egypt citing concerns about irrigated land becoming desert and Sudan questioning the safety of the dam (Salman, 2016). The creation of the dam was for the sole purpose of hydropower generation according to the Ethiopian Government (Salman, 2016). Eventually, however, Sudan's position softened when it dawned upon them that the Dam could actually be beneficial to Sudanese interests in that the Dam was likely to mitigate against flooding risk and thus damage to property and crops (Salman, 2016). In spite of concerns, the project went ahead - much to Egypt's chagrin with some in Egypt even calling for military action against the Dam (Salman, 2016). Nonetheless, a panel was established in November 2011 consisting of 10 members with each party evenly represented. Talks between the panel lasted for just under 4 years before a mutual agreement was struck between all 3 on 23rd March 2015 in light of the report commissioned by MiT. The agreement reached highlighted the necessity for cooperation and the need for parties to act in good faith amongst other things (Salman, 2016). 

The example of the GERD serves to highlight the end of an era in some respects. That is to say, no longer can lower riparians assert (perhaps) undue influence over upper riparians (Salman, 2013). This is largely in part due to the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) which was launched in 1999 in the hope that the 10 riparian states could be brought to together at the ministerial level (Salman, 2013). The aim of the NBI is to foster cooperation between the various riparians in aid of benefitting said countries inhabitants (Salman, 2013). It can perhaps be argued that due to the increasing population of Africa and thus the ever increasing vested interests of the nations involved, there is in fact, no other means to manage transboundary waters. In other words, various riparians, not just around the Nile but around the world also have appreciated that politics and discourse is the optimal method to manage water resources in aid of achieving mutually beneficial outcomes. Moreover, the political dynamic can be unpicked further; especially the commission of the construction of the Dam originally. The Dam started construction in 2011, crucially the same year Egypt, the upper riparian in this political relationship, was plunged into turmoil with the occcurence of the Arab Spring and the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak. As Egypt was otherwise occupied, it was politically expedient time for Ethiopia to make their move as it were. Given the political turmoil in Egypt, Ethiopia arguably had, and took the time to sufficiently make their mark and start the building of the Dam.

To conclude, Transboundary Waters are inherently characterised political dynamics and discourses. As illustrated by the case study of the GERD, we can see how many different political dynamics are at play. In that particular case, we see the practices of geopolitics played out by Ethiopia pouncing when a rival actor (Egypt) is otherwise occupied in order to further their own interests. Moreover, more generally the construction of the GERD highlights the shift towards a world of cooperation and discourse in managing transboundary waters - something which is imperative in order to efficiently fight the challenges and mitigate against the risks of the immediate future.